If one looks on the global economy, then one should admit it has changed from 1989 to 2019 much more than global politics has.
While the political rivalry actually never disappeared entirely, and nations like Russia never became liberal democracies, the “end of economic history” could be easily recorded.
Both parts of the world’s economy became well dependent on each other, and in this new order there were no reasons for economic wars and quarrels.
If one remembers the economic history of both the 1990s and 2000s, then one will find few cases of rivalry.
Selling its software, the Western powers didn’t sell the knowledge embodied in the original program, they sold just the copies which could be reproduced in any additional quantity at zero cost.
At the same time, the newly emerged economies in Asia used the American technologies to create the sophisticated hardware producing these goods in increasing amounts therefore establishing themselves as “ultimate industrial societies.” This new configuration was perfectly post-historical in Fukuyama’s sense.
Both Intel and AMD lead the development of new generation chips while the mass manufacturing of these devices has been relocated to Asia—where many companies like SK Hynix of South Korea or TSMC and UMC of Taiwan position themselves as the competitors of American firms but depend on them for the most vital technologies used.
In 2018, more than 65 percent of all smartphones produced in the world were manufactured in China—and among these 78 percent were built by “genuine” Chinese brands, from Huawei and Xiaomi to OPPO and Vivo.
Previously the nations that tried to “catch up” actually used the same technologies as the others, but in a more effective way; this explains why their economic rivalry only reinforced the political one.
The fight for the markets excluded compromises simply because the entire game was a zero-sum one: if someone’s share rose, the other’s decreased.